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Vision, Touch and Feminist Epistemology
Elizabeth Walden
La difference entre la vision et le toucher, la distance et la proximite, est cruciale
pour comprendre le role des sens dans la pensee et la pratique orientales. Par
consequent, le renversement de la hierarchie etablie entre la vision et le toucher
(c.-a-d. la predominance de la pensee sur la vision) n'altererait pas vraiment
l'ordre politique qui depend de cette difference. Walden examine cette idee par
le biais du film tout a fait tactile The Thin Red Line (Terrence Malik, 1998)
et en arrive a la conclusion que nous avons besoin d'une epistemologie
feministe qui nous aide a penser les sens dans leur dimension humaine
unifiee.
When we begin to call into question the hegemony of vision within art and
culture, we are at the same time by implication drawing into question our
understanding of aesthetics itself and the relation of aesthetics to philoso-
phy and to politics. The idea that aesthetics pertains particularly to art
and, hence, to a circumscribed type of practice and experience, depends
upon the neat compartmentalization of aesthetic experience, knowledge,
and politics, which characterizes modernity. Art provides a safe realm
within which to experience affect and engage sensuous particularity.
Philosophy can then, in contradistinction to art, conceive of its relation to
its object as one of rational comprehension free of the traces of affect and
the sensuous. This neat division of labor in turn provides a basis for the
legitimation of the modern nation state, which deploys a rhetoric of auton-
omy and rational participation while mobilizing an ideology which pro-
duces cohesion through affect and the sentimental attachment to national
identity (Eagleton).
The hegemony of vision plays a significant role in the production and
maintenance of this condition. Affect and sensuous particularity are expe-
rienced in the realm of art, but only at a contemplative distance.
Philosophy, or rational comprehension more generally, also operates on
the basis of analogy with vision. But, of course, like the eye itself which
sees but does not see itself seeing, the Western tradition has mistaken its
construction of a transcendental perspective for an access to an unmediat-
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ed comprehension, if not of the world, at least of consciousness or think-
ing itself. Detachment, distance, objectivity recur at all levels of modern
constructions of art, philosophy and politics, and function as the princi-
ples of disavowal for everything that is done in their names.
To propose, then, to discuss the senses, as this special issue of Tessera
does, is to involve ourselves inevitably in deeply complex political, philo-
sophical and aesthetic issues. Indeed, the very existence of this issue
already implies a critique of our culture's traditional sensory hierarchies
and metaphors. The recognition of the various ways in which vision is
affirmed at the expense of the other senses in the West draws attention to
the body as the site of our engagement with the world, and the senses as
powerful figures for understanding that engagement. This gesture itself
responds to a patriarchal tradition that values detachment, distance, and
objectivity with a recognition that the latter are possible only in the con-
text of connection, proximity, and material participation: this is to respond
to a model based on analogy with sight, with one based on analogy with
touch.
The situation is much more complex, however. Sight and touch form a
unique sensory couple: "the sense of touch had been an integral part of
classical theories of vision in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries"
and while the relationship of vision to touch becomes increasingiy tenu-
ous in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the patterns of distance and
proximity that their relationship suggests remain operative throughout
modernity (Crary 19). The tactile is the silent partner of vision, helping to
legitimate its hegemony even as it is ideologically disavowed. At the same
time, however, as the repressed, the tactile has provided the model for a
radical response to the culture of ocularcentrism. The immediacy and
implicit agency of the tactile threaten the detachment and passivity upon
which ocularcentric society depends.
Given this dual character of the tactile, however, we need to be suspi-
cious of our tradition's opposition between vision and touch and the way
that this opposition makes the tactile appear to be a seductive alternative
to the hegemony of vision. We are in the midst of a time of the disorder-
ing of the senses, which presents an opportunity to produce a politics of
scale, which in turn recognizes the body as the fragile locus of our relation
to the world and to others. The danger is that our exploration of the prox-
imate will generate a new paradigm of power, which extrapolates from
embodied experience to produce a metaphysics of proximity, that would
replace ocularcentrism with its tactile equivalent without ever drawing
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into question the way in which they both idealize and detach the sensory
apparatus from the human/animal body for ideological purposes. We
need, then, not to critique vision, but to redeem it, as we explore how con-
sciousness of the sensorium changes the ways we understand ourselves in
the world.
It is this tension between the senses per se and their ideological use
which necessitates my moving between the terms "vision" and "touch" to
the more generic terms "distance" and "proximity." For these latter repre-
sent the way in which the senses are extrapolated and idealized in order
to play an ideological role. So, for instance, to understand the ideological
role of vision in modernity is to understand it as a principle of distance,
detachment, and objectivity, even though human vision does not attain
these conditions inits embodied sensory form.
In what follows I want to say some more about the role of the proximate
in modern society and what I have called its dual character and, then, with
reference to Terrence Malick's film The Thin Red Line, to talk about the way
in which even the tactile can become a metaphysical principle, if not
brought into dialectical relation with vision. While Malick's film presents
a gorgeous depiction of the tactile dimension of experience, his occlusion
of the female and his circumscribed context of war underscore the neces-
sity of bringing feminist epistemology to bear upon any consideration of
the senses.
The most powerful critical description of the ocularcentric society is still
that given to us by the 5ituationists some thirty-plus years ago. As Guy
Debord describes it, this society is one produced through a process of
"separation," which takes what is proximate to our experience and recon-
structs it at a distance as a spectacle for us to consume. "Everything that
was directly lived," he writes, "has moved away into a representation" 0).
Our own lives and the pleasures of our bodies are expropriated from us
and sold back to us as consumer products.
What Debord realized, however, is that this process of separation results
in the destruction of distance. As he writes, "the spectacle obliterates the
boundaries between self and world by crushing the self besieged by the
presence-absence of the world and it obliterates the boundaries between
true and false by driving all lived truth below the real presence of fraud
ensured by the organization of appearance" (219). The distancing that is
the spectacle allows that which seems most distant, most detached from
our own experience, to take root in our very bodies as our "lived truth."
Hence, the intense visualization of contemporary societies depends upon
Vision, Touch and Feminist Epistemology . 121
a covert proximity for their legitimation. The spectacle entrances us while
nudging our bodies toward a certain kind of material appropriation of a
commodified world. This pattern is repeated within the Western concep-
tion of reason more generally, wherein a rhetoric of rationalism with its
objectivity and detachment and metaphors of sight, disavows affect, emo-
tion, the body, the erotic, etc., as irrational. And yet it is precisely the mobi-
lization of these so-called irrational elements of human life through
ideology that secures the rationalist order. Because proximity is officially
disavowed, it is always in danger of returning as the monstrous other of
reason. Irrationalism is the shadow of rationalism and its alibi for those
moments when the repressed proximate erupts into the smoothly func-
tioning world of distance and objectivity.
So proximity has an ideological function in modernity, but it is also, as
Debord reminds us, what the society of the spectacle has stolen from us. It
is lived experience, our own embodied immediacy, and because it is the
repressed or invisible factor in our tradition, it is a powerful and destabi-
lizing challenge to it.
Art is particularly significant in exploring this challenge because it is
where "the human sensorium" can still be engaged; it provides a model
for experience in general. This is why Walter Benjamin finds, what were
for him the new mass media, especially film, promising - they can bring
sensuous experience, which has been compartmentalized within the fine
arts, to a mass audience. They bring perception beyond the contemplative,
the merely optical, and make possible a "tactile appropriation" of life. He
writes,
By close-ups of the things around us, by focusing on hidden details of
familiar objects, by exploring commonplace milieus under the inge-
nious guidance of the camera, the film, on the one hand, extends our
comprehension of the necessities which rule our lives; on the other
hand, it manages to assure us of an immense and unexpected field of
action. (236)
Childhood also presents an important model of the tactile for Benjamin.
Before we are trained into a consumer culture that says "Look, but don't
touch," our engagement with the world moves easily between looking
and touching. What Benjamin finds in the child's consciousness is the con-
nection between perception and action that is the mark of a revolutionary
consciousness in adults. According to 5usan Buck-Morss, "Children's cog-
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nition had revolutionary power because it was tactile, and hence tied to
action, and because rather than accepting the given meaning of things,
children got to know objects by laying hold of them and using them cre-
atively, releasing from them new possibilities of meaning" (264). Proximity
provides "a mode of cognition involving sensuous, somatic, and tactile
forms of perception; a non-coercive engagement with the other that opens
the self to experience, but also, in a darker vein, 'a rudiment of the ... pow-
erful compulsion to become and behave like something else'" (Hansen
329-30). So while the tactile is a powerful destabilizing factor in a world of
hegemonic vision, it produces a troubling metaphor for our relation to the
world and others. The loss of self, ecstatic fusion, the child's easy transi-
tion from seeing to appropriation (and often then digestion) seems a lim-
ited model of relation in a world in which appropriation is an all too
familiar and all too violent form of engagement.
The seductions and the dangers of the tactile as an alternative paradigm
are beautifully articulated in Terrence Malick's 1998 film The Thin Red Line.
The film is virtually a Benjaminian primer on the recovery of the sensori-
um. Although the action takes place in wartime, the camera, along with
our protagonist, continually directs our attention away from the spectacle
and fascination of war and the mentality that engenders it toward the
small details of sensuous life that war destroys or renders invisible.
During lulls in battle we hear the ambient sounds of nature; the camera
makes us witness the gorgeous play of light and wind in a glade that will
soon become a killing field; We see in detail the effects on flora and fauna
of the detached thinking that perpetuates war. We even hear the silent and
repressed dialogues of individual men who are tortured by the brutality of
their own actions and experience. This lush film reminds us of the planet
that our vision is so blindly destroying; it reminds us of the value of play
and sensuality; it reminds us of our common human bond.
But there is something profoundly disturbing about the alternative that
the film suggests: namely the tactile paradigm's comfortable coexistence
with war. Granted the "new man" (Pvt. Witt, played by Jim Caviezel) the
film presents to us harbors no hatred for the enemy and would prefer to
play and flirt endlessly with the tribal peoples whose way of life is being
destroyed by war. But he has no answer to it; its logic does not exist for
him. He is represented as a man who has "seen another world," a saint, a
stranger. This new man of proximity belongs to what Michel Maffesoli
calls "the time of the tribes." He accepts his platoon as his family. And
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while this leads to a laudable sense of responsibility, love, and caring for
his brothers, it also makes him into the perfect soldier: courageous and
willing. His example suggests two mutually exclusive orders: that of dis~
tance, vision, and war, which we cannot help but participate in, but whose
values we must not embody; and that of the tactile, for which war is a
troubling fact, a fact which nevertheless bears little upon the responsibili-
ties and delights of immediacy. But the celebration of the proximate pre-
sents no new alternative; this is the false choice modernity has always
presented us: affect and sensuous particularity are again circumscribed so
that the hegemony of vision, represented here by war, can continue unim-
peded. In this case, sensuous particularity is not compartmentalized in art,
but becomes part of a way of life that is nevertheless compatible with war
and global exploitation.
It is at this apparent dead-end that feminist epistemology can come to
our aid. In particular, I have in mind the work of Dorothy Smith who,
while concerned primarily with theorizing sociological method, develops
a feminist epistemology which will allow us to negotiate these issues of
distance and proximity. Smith draws upon the work of Alfred Schutz and
others who suggest that there are different cognitive domains that struc-
ture our realities. But whereas Schutz describes two alternative realities, a
paramount reality and the domain of science, Smith describes an abstract-
ed mode of science that is always located within the world of local and
material actualities, but which implicitly disavows this location (84~85).
Her model, then, is not one which opposes distance and proximity, but one
which explains the possibility of distance through its relation to proximi-
ty.
A "conceptual mode of action" (Smith 81) that transcends and neglects
the local, the material, the bodily is promoted by our society at the expense
of the proximate. It is still largely women's work to attend to the details of
everyday life and to "facilitate men's occupation of the conceptual mode
of action" (83). And this is true even though women are not excluded from
the conceptual mode of action. This means, however, that given our social
organization, women occupy two distinct and often conflicting cognitive
spaces and, as a result, according to Smith, have a bifurcated conscious-
ness. For our purposes this means that women must continually negotiate
between distance and proximity. The bifurcation prevents the clean entry
into the space of abstracted rationalistic explanation that transcends the
particularity of locality and bodily existence. Smith's epistemology
124 . Tessera
embraces this bifurcation and thereby insists that the cognitive mode of
action is always already embedded within the local and the material. She
writes,
Beginning from the standpoint of women locates a subject who begins
in a material and local world. It shows the different cognitive domains
structuring our realities ... as a bifurcation of consciousness, with a
world directly experienced from oneself as center (in the body) on the
one hand and a world organized in the abstracted conceptual mode,
external to the local and particular places of one's bodily existence.
The abstracted mode of the scientific province is always located in the
local and material actualities.... The organization that divides the
two becomes visible from this base. It is not visible from within the
others. (84-85)
It is perhaps no accident that women are relegated to men's fantasies in
The Thin Red Line. They serve in the film as part of what exposes the role
of the proximate in the lives of these soldiers: these men remember
women's bodies, the flow of their dresses, their smiles, the immediacy of
a life left behind, but which gives meaning to their present. The only
words we hear from women are in letters to and flirtations with men; they
seem to bear no relation to this devastating war. Arguably, First Sergeant
Welsh (Sean Penn) disrupts the duality of distance and proximity that the
film portrays. Penn despises those above him in the chain of command,
who know nothing of the conditions on the ground, and he has a begrudg-
ing respect for "the new man," whom he nevertheless hopes to reform. But
Welsh is crushed by his position, reduced to cynicism and resignation,
which are the only responses to war that the battlefield seems to allow
him.
But Smith's alternative is not one of cynicism and resignation; it is noth-
ing short of a radical restructuring of human knowledge and, we can
extrapolate, the insistence upon the redemption of all the human senses.
As I argued in the beginning, our ability to thematize the role of senses in
modernity suggests that the dominant sensory hierarchies are loosening.
This signals a moment of possibility, but it also suggests an emerging
order in which vision does not predominate. The society of the spectacle,
which trained its citizens to "look, but don't touch," has learned to draw
the entire sensorium into its maw and encourage the vestigial child in all
of us to emerge. New interactive technologies like video games give us
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virtual bodies to inhabit and direct, hypertext makes the practice of read-
ing into a very tactile three-dimensional experience. A whole range of new
age products exists to help us explore our sensorium in private. Indeed,
we seem to have entered a new age of play, one which allows for the
exploration of all our senses, but in a way whose destabilizing potential
often seems already recuperated. This means that the tactile itself will not
provide an alternative paradigm. A new metaphysics of the tactile will just
cohabitate with or recapitulate the problems of ocularcentrism. Instead,
we need to learn from our senses to refuse to extrapolate from our senses.
More fundamentally than new sensory hierarchies, we need new models
of reason and relation to the world. Then, perhaps, our sensory experience
will change as well. Perhaps we will discover that vision, too, has a prox-
imate character and that we can feel at a distance, that distance and prox-
imity are not in vexed opposition to one another, but together characterize
our relation to the world and to others.
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